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## **Turkish-Russian Relations in the Context of the Vision of the Great Turan and the Emerging New Global Order**

**R**elations between the Republic of Türkiye (RT) and the Russian Federation (FR) are complex and multifaceted - on the one hand, cooperation, and on the other, rivalry and expanding their influence at the expense of the other<sup>169</sup>. Turkey's success in the South Caucasus<sup>170</sup>, Russia's fears that Turkey will want to transfer its success to Central Asia, the increase in popularity of the Great Turan idea, built on the ideology of Turkish unity, which has also begun to gain popularity in Russia<sup>171</sup> - these are some events that prove the growing importance of Turkey in the region and the weakening of Russia's position. However, there were also events such as: tightening the cooperation between Türkiye and Russia (for instance the Gas Hub<sup>172</sup>) amid the ongoing war in Ukraine<sup>173</sup>, and Erdoğan's ostentatious praise of relations with Russia before the second round of elections<sup>174</sup> and Erdoğan's victory<sup>175</sup>, in the light of which the discussed relations take on a new quality.

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<sup>169</sup> M. Skura, *Wizja Wielkiego Turanu*, [in:] *Azja i Europa: Kultura i konflikt w warunkach cyfryzacji świata*, eds. J. Marszałek-Kawa, K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz, Toruń 2023, 143 p.

<sup>170</sup> A. Gabuev, *Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey - unlikely victors of Karabakh conflict*. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54903869> (11.05.2021).

<sup>171</sup> S. Sukhankin, *The Great Turan: Russia's Concerns about Turkey's Growing Reputation in Caucasus and Central Asia*. URL: <https://politicstoday.org/the-great-turan-russia-turkey-caucasuscentral-asia/> (17.03.2022).

<sup>172</sup> D. Jones, *Erdogan Agrees to Putin's Plan for Turkey to Be Russian Gas Hub*. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/erdogan-agrees-to-putin-s-plan-for-turkey-to-be-russian-gas-hub/6798604.html> (30.05.2023).

<sup>173</sup> E. Mohamed and U. Siddiqui, *Russia-Ukraine live: War intensifies as drones target Moscow*, Al Jazeera. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/5/30/russia-ukraine-live-news-moscow-hit-by-rare-drone-attack> (30.05.2023).

<sup>174</sup> T. Qiblawi and I. Sariyuce, *Erdogan hails 'special relationship' with Putin ahead of crucial Turkey runoff vote*, CNN. URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-interview-mime-intl/index.html> (20.05.2023).

<sup>175</sup> G. Tuysuz, Y. Gezer and T. Qiblaw, *Erdogan wins Turkish election, extending rule to third decade*, CNN. URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/28/europe/turkey-president-runoff-polls-erdogan-intl/index.html> (29.05.2023).

The choice of the topic undertaken in this article was dictated by its timeliness and complexity, and therefore the deficit of scientific studies on this issue and the fact that the next installment of Türkiye-Russia relations may significantly affect not only the shaping of their influence in the region, but also the shaping a new global order, this publication is a contribution not only to Polish, but also to world science.

The aim of the article is to present the most and least likely scenarios for relations between Türkiye and Russia for the years 2024-2040 in the context of the vision of the Great Turan and the emerging new global order, which take into account the economic situation of Türkiye and Russia and the forecasted outcome of the war in Ukraine. The adopted time perspective for the years 2024-2040 results from the convergence with the strategic document "Turkic World Vision 2040"<sup>176</sup>.

The publication, in which neoclassical realism<sup>177</sup> was applied, used the scenario method<sup>178</sup>, which allowed for a clear presentation of the driving forces and mechanisms that may affect cooperation between Russia and Türkiye in the context of the vision of the Great Turan and the emerging new global order.

The paper poses the following research question: How will Turkish-Russian relations evolve and what will it lead to both in terms of influence in the region (reactivation or fiasco of the Great Turan) and changes in the international world order?

The answer to the research question posed in this way will be aided by the verification of the research hypothesis: Ankara-Moscow relations will be both strengthened and weakened in the future, which most likely will not prevent the implementation of the Great Turan project, which in turn may have a significant impact on the emerging new multipolar global order, in which Türkiye will become a very significant player in the international arena.

In the study, the author reached for selected, in terms of the discussed issue: statements, communications, comments, opinions, analyses, scientific publications, and press materials.

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<sup>176</sup> Organization of Turkic States, *Turkic World Vision 2040*, Web page Organization of Turkic States. URL: [https://www.turkkon.org/en/haberler/turkic-world-vision-2040\\_2396](https://www.turkkon.org/en/haberler/turkic-world-vision-2040_2396) (17.01.2023).

<sup>177</sup> J. Czapotowicz, *Mapa współczesnego realizmu: realizm klasyczny, neorealizm, realizm neoklasyczny*, 33 p., Strona PTSM, <http://ptsm.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/publikacje/teoria-realizmu-w-nauce-o-stosunkach-miedzynarodowych/J.Czapotowicz.pdf> (10.03.2022).

<sup>178</sup> Han Dong-ho, *Scenario Construction and Its Implications for International Relations Research*, „The Korean Journal of International Studies”, 2011, Vol. 9, No. 1, 44 p.

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### Turkish-Russian relations in a dynamic international reality

Turkey's condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but at the same time Erdoğan's statement that his country will continue to maintain relations with both countries<sup>179</sup>, Turkey's (Türkiye's<sup>180</sup>)\* refusal to join the EU sanctions imposed on Russia<sup>181</sup>, Turkey restricting the access of Russian ships from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea<sup>182</sup>, Turkey prohibiting Russia from flying to Syria via its territory (the ban applying to military and civilian aircraft that would carry military personnel<sup>183</sup>; while at the same time, Turkey still allowing for commercial flights to and from Russia) - these are examples that perfectly reflect the character of the complicated relations between Türkiye and Russia. A marked improvement in relations between Erdoğan and Putin came after their meeting in Sochi in September 2021<sup>184</sup>. President Erdoğan's words from the interview with CNN conducted before the second round of the presidential elections touched the whole world. Erdoğan talked about "special" and growing relationship with President Vladimir Putin despite mounting pressure on Ankara to help bolster Western sanctions against Moscow. Erdoğan said that: "We are not at a point where we would impose sanctions on Russia like the West have done. We are not bound by the West's sanctions" and "Russia and Turkey need each other in every field possible"<sup>185</sup>. According to the author, this was the intention of the president of Türkiye.

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<sup>179</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Erdogan Says Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Is 'Unacceptable,' But Is Keeping Ties With Both Nations*, RFE/RL. URL: <https://www.rferl.org/a/erdogan-russian-invasion-unacceptable-ukraine/31728802.html> (28.02.2022).

<sup>180</sup> United Nations, *Turkey's name changed to Türkiye*. URL: <https://turkiye.un.org/en/184798-turkeys-name-changed-turkiye> (18.05.2023).

\*The paper assumes that for the events that took place when RT was under the old name, the old name of Turkey was used, for the events that took place when RT was under the new name, the new name of Türkiye was used, and for the events that took place both then when RT was under the old and the new name, both names were used – Turkey and Türkiye.

<sup>181</sup> D. Jones, *Turkey's Opposition to Russian Sanctions Stokes Suspicions of Sanctions-Busting*. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-s-opposition-to-russian-sanctions-stokes-suspicions-of-sanction-busting-/6490132.html> (20.03.2022).

<sup>182</sup> The Print, *Zelenskyy thanks Turkish President for banning passage of Russian warships to Black Sea, military support to Ukraine*. URL: <https://theprint.in/world/zelenskyy-thanks-turkish-president-for-banning-passage-of-russian-warships-to-black-sea-military-support-to-ukraine/849547/> (26.02.2022).

<sup>183</sup> Al Jazeera, *Turkey closes airspace to Russian planes flying to Syria: FM*. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/23/turkey-closes-airspace-to-russian-planes-flying-to-syria-fm>, (24.04.2022).

<sup>184</sup> AL JAZEERA AND NEWS AGENCIES, *Syria high on agenda as Putin and Erdogan meet in Sochi*. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/29/syria-high-agenda-putin-erdogan-meet-sochi> (31.05.2023).

<sup>185</sup> T. Qiblawi and I. Sariyuce, *Erdogan hails 'special relationship'...op. cit.*

Erdoğan wanted to demonstrate to his voters (who are mostly in favor of cooperation with Russia and China, rather than cooperation with the EU and the US<sup>186</sup>) as well as any potential voters that his actions are aimed at protecting Türkiye's interests and taking initiatives that will reduce inflation and tackle Türkiye's economic problems. Does this mean that in the era of the emerging new global order, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the weakening of Russia's position, President Erdoğan abandoned plans to enter the Russian sphere of influence, and thus abandoned plans to unite the Turkish nation and the vision of the Great Turan? According to the author, no, as it only means that Türkiye, like Russia, has serious economic problems and the countries need each other. When analyzing Türkiye-Russia relations in the context of the discussed topic, it is impossible to consider them in isolation from Türkiye's relations with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which are also post-Soviet republics. Thus, relations between Russia and the Turkish states will also have an impact on whether the Great Turan will arise.

Due to publishing limitations, it is impossible to analyze all initiatives and current events that concern relations between Türkiye - Russia - Turkish states / post-Soviet republics, but the actions of Kazakhstan and its inhabitants (until recently the most faithful ally of the Russian Federation) are worth signaling. These include:

- the refusal of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) to support Russia in the war with Ukraine and the non-recognition of the separatist republics created by Russia - the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic<sup>187</sup>;
- Joint Statement of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and President of The Republic of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan On Enhanced Strategic Partnership<sup>188</sup>;
- the initiative of people of Kazakhstan who signed the appeal posted on the largest online petition platform, which calls for the country to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The authors also call for the severing of ties with the Russian Federation and the suspension of the integration processes

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<sup>186</sup> Skura M., *Wizja Wielkiego... op. cit., p. 155.*

<sup>187</sup> Piotr Aleksander, *One of Russia's closest allies denies request for troops.* URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1289976/ncrd1289985#liveBlogCards> (30.03.2022).

<sup>188</sup> President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Official website), *Joint Statement of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and President of The Republic of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan On Enhanced Strategic Partnership.* URL: <https://www.akorda.kz/en/joint-statement-of-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayev-and-president-of-the-republic-of-trkiye-recep-tayyip-erdoan-on-enhanced-strategic-partnership-104238> (30.05.2023).

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(over 60,000 people supported the Kazakh resolution demanding that the Kazakh authorities withdraw from the CSTO and the EEU and cut off all activities aimed at integration with Moscow)<sup>189</sup>.

These indicate an anti-Russian trend.

In the aspect of the discussed topic, it should be emphasized that President Erdoğan's actions to consolidate the Turkish nation are well-thought-out, multidirectional, as well as implemented consistently and on a large scale (Organization of Turkic States, tightening military cooperation with individual countries, as well as military support at the request of a given country (example of Azerbaijan), and promoting Türkiye and Turkish culture in the world (changing Turkey's name, changing the name of its airline)<sup>190,191</sup>.

However, it should be remembered that the position of Russia and its economic situation is not only dependent on Türkiye, the post-Soviet republics, the United States or EU countries, but also on countries that currently (May 2023) support Russia or are neutral towards it<sup>192</sup>.

Will relations between Russia and Türkiye survive in such a dynamically changing reality? If so, will the Great Turan project be realized?

The author's position on how the discussed relations may evolve not only depending on the economic situation of Türkiye (as the country setting the tone for these relations), but also the changing situation on the international arena (taking into account the outcome of the war in Ukraine), and at the same time how these relations may affect the design of the Great Turan and the fate of the world, were reflected in the scenarios developed and presented below, the starting point of which was the current situation (May 2023) in the world.

### **Scenario method - identifying the issue, driving forces, time perspective, solution scenarios**

The work attempts to create the most and least likely scenarios, "in which identifying the issue is": cooperation between Russia and Türkiye in the context of the vision of Great Turan and the emerging new global order. The driving forces are:

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<sup>189</sup> B. Kwiatkowska, Kazachstan. Antyrośyjski ferment. Naród już nie chce iść tą drogą. URL: <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kazachstan-antyrośyjski-ferment-narod-juz-nie-chce-isc-ta-droga-6908183243852352a> (12.06.2023).

<sup>190</sup> M. Skura, *Wizja Wielkiego... op. cit., p. 158*.

<sup>191</sup> M. Skura, *Erdoğan's Phenomenon in Turkish Foreign Policy*, presentations at the 10<sup>th</sup> International Asian Congress, May 17-19, 2023, Toruń.

<sup>192</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Russia's pockets of support are growing in the developing world. URL: <https://www.eiu.com/n/russias-pockets-of-support-are-growing-in-the-developing-world/> (30.05.2023).

1. Türkiye 's economic situation;
2. Economic situation in Russia;
3. Türkiye's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan);
4. Russia's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan);
5. Türkiye's mediation in the war between Russia and Ukraine;
6. The outcome of the war in Ukraine;
7. Türkiye 's internal situation (continuation or not of Erdoğan's current foreign policy after 2028 by his successor);
8. The position of the United States on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan;
9. China's position on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan.

In all developed scenarios, it was assumed that the key driving force is Türkiye's internal situation, as whether or not Türkiye emerges from the economic crisis will have an impact on its actions in the international arena and its standing on the international stage. The adopted time perspective for the years 2024-2040 results from the convergence with the strategic document "Turkic World Vision 2040".

**The most likely scenario: Cooperation between Türkiye and Russia will be maintained, while the Great Turan project will be implemented as a result of which Türkiye, already a major player in world diplomacy, becomes a very significant player in the emerging new multipolar global order**

#### Variant A

1. Türkiye 's economic situation - will overcome the economic crisis;
2. Economic situation in Russia - will improve;
3. Türkiye's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will be strengthened;
4. Russia's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will weaken;
5. Türkiye's mediation in the war between Russia and Ukraine - Türkiye, acting as a mediator, will contribute to the signing of the truce;
6. The outcome of the war in Ukraine - signing a truce satisfactory to Ukraine;

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7. Türkiye 's internal situation - continuation of Erdoğan's current foreign policy after 2028 by his successor;
  8. The position of the United States on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan - initially distancing themselves from the project of uniting the Turkish nation, but in the long term supporting the Great Turan project;
  9. China's position on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan – opposition.

The key driving force in this scenario is Türkiye's economic situation. It can be presumed that Türkiye will tighten cooperation with Russia until the economic crisis is surmounted. The tightening of cooperation between Türkiye and Russia will not, however, stop Türkiye from strengthening cooperation with the Turkish national states (the main driving force with a large impact). At the same time, the Turkish states, which are also post-Soviet republics, will turn away from Russia (the example of Kazakhstan shows that this is already happening), thus this driving force of moderate influence will strengthen Türkiye and weaken the Russian Federation. As for the economic situation of Russia (the main driving force with a moderate impact), it will improve, as the strengthening of Russian-Turkish cooperation will also be accompanied by the strengthening of cooperation of other countries with the Russian Federation (FR), as indicated by current analyzes<sup>193</sup>. According to the author, these tendencies will deepen, i.e. the number of countries not only neutral but, above all, on the side of Russia (mainly developing countries) will increase, which in practice will mean not only resignation from public criticism of Russia, but above all, it will mean economic cooperation between these countries and the Russian Federation and help from Russia so that it can avoid Western sanctions. In addition, most likely, over time individual EU countries will oppose the imposition of the most severe sanctions, and some countries will start to renew business relations with Russia, which will favor the Russian Federation in the long run. However, the counterweight may be the severe sanctions that the United States will consistently impose on the Russian Federation. In such a situation, Russia's economic improvement (the main driving force with a moderate impact) will not be significant enough for the Russian Federation to dictate the conditions when signing the truce (the main driving force with a large impact), which, according to the author, will be decisive in resolving the conflict to Ukraine's benefit. Most likely, Türkiye will be the mediator (the main driving force with high influence) that

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<sup>193</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Russia's pockets of support ... op. cit.*

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will contribute to the signing of the truce, which will make Türkiye the winner of the mediation, and President Erdogan will be able to talk about his personal success. These events would weaken Russia's position, and thus strengthen Türkiye's position in the region and on the international arena, as well as in relations with the West. It should be emphasized, however, that the signed agreement would most likely lift all sanctions against Russia, because otherwise Russia would most likely not agree to the signing of the truce and would threaten with, for example, a nuclear war. Thus, it can be assumed that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, individual states would successively resume cooperation with Russia, and the states that cooperated with Russia during the war in Ukraine would continue and develop this cooperation. And in such an international reality, Türkiye would intensify activities leading to the reactivation of the Great Turan in a new version, i.e. the consolidation of national Turkish states under the leadership of Türkiye. In practice, this could mean signing a document in which individual Turkish nation states declare accession to the Great Turan under the leadership of Türkiye. Most likely, this would take place by 2040 or in 2040, because, according to the author, the document "Turkic World Vision 2040" adopted during the meeting of the Organization of Turkish States may indicate that the year 2040 suggest that for that moment Erdoğan is planning some spectacular event that will significantly strengthen Türkiye's position in the world, such as the creation of the Great Turan. Implementation of the vision of the Great Turan would depend on the continuation of the policy pursued by President Erdogan by his successor (the main driving force with great influence). With such changes in the international arena, it cannot be ruled out that, despite the initial distancing of the United States from the Great Turan project, in the long run, Türkiye's unification of the Turkish nation could receive support from the United States. Such a situation under the pretext of protecting ethnic minorities or uniting fraternal nations, would affect relations with Russia and China (the main driving force with great influence). China, due to the fact that Great Turan could also enter the Chinese sphere (the Chinese Xinjiang district (inhabited by Uyghurs)) would oppose this concept and continue cooperation with Russia (the main driving force with a moderate impact). To what extent could these actions affect relations between Türkiye and Russia? According to the author of this publication, this will be determined by the economic situation of these countries, and Türkiye will be the main player in these relations. It can be assumed with high probability that these relations will not be broken, but at most they will be loosened (for instance on the part of Türkiye, if Türkiye's economic situation is so favorable that RT will not need very close cooperation with Russia).



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As a consequence of the events described above, we may become witnesses of a progressive process of multipolarity in the world, in which Türkiye, already a major player in world diplomacy, would become a very significant player in the emerging new multipolar global order and, paradoxically, Türkiye would come closer to the West, but at the same time, it would not sever relations with Russia.

### Variant B

1. Türkiye's economic situation - will overcome the economic crisis;
2. Economic situation in Russia - will improve significantly;
3. Türkiye's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will be strengthened;
4. Russia's cooperation with the Turkish states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will weaken;
5. Türkiye's mediation in the war between Russia and Ukraine - Türkiye, acting as a mediator, will contribute to the signing of the truce;
6. The outcome of the war in Ukraine - signing of a truce satisfactory to Russia;
7. Türkiye 's internal situation - a possible change of the political option in 2028 will most probably not, in simple terms, not result in a drastic change of policy on the consolidation of the Turkish nation, while relations between Türkiye and Russia could become significantly weaker;
8. The position of the United States on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan - initially distancing themselves from the project of uniting the Turkish nation, but in the long term supporting the Great Turan project;
9. China's position on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan – opposition.

Similarly to the previous scenario, the Russian-Turkish cooperation developing during the war in Ukraine would contribute to overcoming the economic crisis in Türkiye (a key driving force). The strengthening of cooperation between Türkiye and the Turkish states (the main driving force with a large impact) would also be continued, and the Turkish national states would turn away from Russia, which would strengthen Türkiye's position.

However, when it comes to the economic situation of Russia (the main driving force with a large impact), a prolonged war in Ukraine would cause an avalanche of individual EU countries to withdraw from the sanctions imposed on Russia, which would start to be very favorable to Russia. If we add to that countries from outside Europe, which would continue the previously started cooperation with Russia, and the countries that were neutral that would

start to cooperate with the Russian Federation, these processes would significantly contribute to the signing of an armistice in which Ukraine agrees to the conditions proposed by the Russian Federation (the main driving force with great influence). US sanctions on Russia (a major driver with moderate impact) would not be enough to tip the scales of victory in favor of Ukraine. Turkish mediation in the signing of the armistice (the main driving force with high influence) would make Türkiye the diplomatic winner of this conflict, while the United States and the West would be the big losers of this war. In this situation, would Türkiye abandon its plans to reactivate Great Turan and enter Russia's sphere of influence? According to the author, no, because a devastated and war-weary Russia (like the whole world), facing Türkiye with a strong army and a controlled economic situation in the country, would not be a sufficient obstacle for Türkiye to abandon the Great Turan project. As in the previous scenario, the US would most likely support the idea of unifying the Turkish nation (while trying to keep Türkiye from being too strong in the international arena) and China would oppose the idea. When it comes to a possible change of political option in Türkiye after the 2028 elections, it is hard to imagine that the new president, regardless of which political option he comes from, and the ruling party would want to squander the potential that President Erdogan had achieved. The only difference that could occur is that the Great Turan would be a compromise worked out between Türkiye and the Russian Federation as to the distribution of influence in the region (because the charisma and effectiveness of Erdogan's successor would affect the decisions reached as part of the distribution of influence between the states, and thus affect the scale of the Great Turan).

Summing up, also in this variant, we would witness the progressing process of multipolarity in the world, in which Türkiye, being already the main player in world diplomacy, would become a very significant player in the emerging new multipolar global order, but Russia would also will find its place. Most likely, Türkiye's relations with Russia would weaken (not break), as Türkiye would continue to expand its influence at the expense of Russia, and, additionally, Euro-enthusiasts would come closer and closer to the United States and the West and strengthen their cooperation with them.

**The least likely scenario: Türkiye will weaken its cooperation with Russia and at the same time give up building the Great Turan project, as a consequence of which its position in the region and ~~on~~ in the international arena will weaken, just like that of Russia**

1. Türkiye's economic situation - Türkiye will not overcome the economic crisis;
2. The economic situation of Russia - will deteriorate significantly;

3. Türkiye's cooperation with the Turkish national states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will weaken;
4. Russia's cooperation with the Turkish national states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) - will weaken;
5. Türkiye's mediation in the war between Russia and Ukraine - Türkiye will resign from the role of mediator;
6. The outcome of war in Ukraine - Ukraine's victory;
7. Türkiye's internal situation - after the end of President Erdogan's term of office, his successor will completely change Türkiye's foreign policy, and consequently will abandon the Great Turan project;
8. US position on the implementation of the vision of Great Turan - not applicable as Türkiye abandons the Great Turan project;
9. China's position on the implementation of the vision of the Great Turan - not applicable as Türkiye abandons the Great Turan project.

Closer cooperation between Türkiye and Russia during the war in Ukraine and after President Erdogan won the elections has not brought the expected results. Türkiye's economic situation is deteriorating even more (key driving force) and Russia's economy is deteriorating as well (main driving force with high impact). At the same time, the Turkish national states are turning their backs on both Russia and Türkiye and are strengthening cooperation with EU countries and China. In this situation, the widely understood West imposes new sanctions on Russia, and as a consequence of all these events, Ukraine wins the war (the main driving force with great influence). Türkiye is not participating in mediation talks. Economically weakened Türkiye, in which there is a change of power in 2028, resigns from Erdogan's plans regarding the Great Turan and takes a course towards the West, which will result in Türkiye's accession to the EU. The big losers would be Russia and Türkiye, whose position on the international arena would be greatly weakened, and the big winners would be Ukraine, the United States, Western countries and those that sided with Ukraine in the war between Russia and Ukraine.

### **Conclusions**

The In the long term, relations between Türkiye and Russia will be both strengthened and relaxed, but not broken. At the same time, the Great Turan project will be implemented, thanks to which Türkiye, which is already a major player in world diplomacy, will be placed in a position of a very important player in the new emerging multipolar world order.

Türkiye will tighten cooperation with Russia until it recovers from the economic crisis. Then Ankara will intensify activities related to the unification of the Turkish nation, the culmination of which will be the reactivation of Great Turan (until 2040) in a new version - the Turkish states under the leadership of Türkiye will declare accession to the Great Turan.

A possible change of power in Türkiye in 2028 (Euro-enthusiasts coming to power) could lead to a significant loosening (not breaking) of relations between Türkiye and Russia, and closer cooperation with the United States and the West. However, it should not cause a drastic change in the policy of uniting the Turkish nation.

Russia could also find its place in the emerging multipolar world order, provided that the signed truce between Russia and Ukraine would be satisfactory for the Russian Federation. Türkiye being the mediator in the signed truce would confirm its position as a major player in world diplomacy and would be the winner of the mediation of this war.

The conducted analysis, raised arguments, and drawn conclusions allowed to confirm the research hypothesis.

### **Streszczenie**

Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie najbardziej i najmniej prawdopodobnych scenariuszy dla stosunków między Turcją a Rosją na lata 2024 – 2040 w kontekście wizji Wielkiego Turanu i kształtującego się nowego globalnego ładu, które uwzględniają sytuację gospodarczą Turcji i Rosji oraz prognozowany wynik wojny w Ukrainie. W pracy postawiono następujące pytanie badawcze: W jaki sposób będą ewoluowały stosunki turecko-rosyjskie i do czego to doprowadzi zarówno jeśli chodzi o wpływy w regionie (reaktywacja lub fiasko Wielkiego Turanu), jak i zmian w międzynarodowym porządku świata? W publikacji wykorzystano metodę scenariuszową. Główne wnioski: W perspektywie długoterminowej stosunki między Turcją a Rosją, będą zarówno wzmacniane, jak i rozluźniane, ale nie zostaną zerwane (1). Jednocześnie zostanie zrealizowany projekt Wielkiego Turanu, dzięki któremu Turcja, będąca już głównym graczem w światowej dyplomacji, uplasuje się na pozycji bardzo liczącego się gracza w nowym kształtującym się wielobiegunowym porządku świata (2).

### **Słowa kluczowe:**

Stosunki turecko-rosyjskie, Wielki Turan, wielobiegunowy porządek świata, wojna w Ukrainie, republiki postsowieckie, stosunki międzynarodowe

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**Key words:**

Turkish-Russian relations, Great Turan, multipolar world order, war in Ukraine, post-Soviet republics, international relations

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