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Social resilience: a forgotten mechanism
supporting the prevention of security threats

Introduction

For more than a decade, Europe has been struggling with an increasing social anxiety because of the effects of inflation, social disparities, climate threats, the inflow of war refugees and economic migrants, deficit of political credibility, energy and food shortages, the pandemic, and, finally, since February 24, 2022, the full-scale war in Ukraine. The possibilities to compensate these problems with use of monetary and fiscal distribution to provide aid and support for growing social groups that feel endangered by multi-faceted security threats are becoming limited[320]. The emerging insecurity reinforces the sense of a loss of stability, while, at the same time, inducing a lack of autonomous resilience that is necessary to protect one's own body against dangers, and, first of all, to protect oneself against fear, anxiety, and panic, i.e., the evolutionary values that perform a warning role in maintaining one's own "self" in the assessment of risk of the threats. The war narration that fills the public space is dominated by various symbols that refer to situational awareness, including the prognosed decomposition of the regional and global security order. In response, people are searching for mechanisms of a resilient response to the recognised threats. Each poorly planned informational campaign may

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[320] The wave of crises started in 2008 because of the destabilisation of the global financial order, which caused many years of global economic recession. In 2012 the scale of debt and loss of monetary trust brought the European Union (EU) to the verge of a structural crisis and a fall of the euro currency zone. In 2014 Russia incorporated the Crimean Peninsula and started the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Since 2015, the EU has been struggling with the refugee crisis that resulted from the wars in the Middle East and in Africa. Later, in 2020 r. the lockdowns introduced in most of the states in response to the global Covid-19 pandemic, led to a deep social and economic depression. When the pandemic had finally slowed down and the international community was hoping for an economic recovery, Russia started a new military aggression in Ukraine, launching actions with the aim to: (1) review the *status quo* of security in Central Europe on terms dictated by Russia, (2) accept the takeover of the incorporated territories, (3) permanently blackmail the West, including threats of using the re-escalation doctrine that assumes, among others, the use of nuclear warfare.

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cause new risks and increase the destruction instead of forming social resilience. Western countries have long delayed the return to shaping a systemic resilience response of the society, which is an integral defence component that was well-developed in the years of cold war 1.0. In this aspect, Russia has been systematically gaining advantage since 2014, by claiming that it is the liberal values that pose an existential threat to the "Russian world" and that the military operations of the NATO in the post-Soviet areas will be an assault on Russian territory. At the same time, annexation was non-negotiable.

The overlapping threats and challenges for security, in particular the fears concerning the escalation of Russian military aggression (the fascistic state of special services) require quick reaction that will include, among others, trans-systemic shaping of the resilience response of the society on the level of programming and organisational actions. This situational requirement results from the observed deterioration of the *animal symbolicum* ability in the average information consumer, which leads to a distorted understanding of the complex dynamics of actions (hybrid ones), where the evil is linked to falsifying the meaning of words, and deception, violence, and destruction are concealed behind the lies. The degree of distortion in the methods of communicating/informing (media evoke the feeling of fear, then the fears are exaggerated, in order to inform alarmingly a while later about how much people are afraid) unwillingly results in selective verbalisation of concrete[321], limiting the ability for abstract thought in *homo videns:* "reverse the progression from sensible to intelligible, returning to the pure and simple act of seeing"[322], and being subjected to "fate" under the influence of growing destruction.

Since the year 2019, "social resilience" has existed not only as a part of medical programmes and announcements aimed at neutralising the effects of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic[323], but also as an aim of political activity. On January 20, 2021, the President of the US, Joseph Biden referred to the role of "resilience" of the American Constitution[324]; Emmanuel Macron advocates the return to "resilience scenarios" that shape the "spirit of resilience". The tasks of shaping "social resilience" are articulated in the programme, organisational, legal, and technical

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[321] This problem was noticed, among others, by Ayn Rand in the early 1960s. In analysing the role of American media in shaping social behaviour, she pointed to the threats to social order that result from using "*twists of undefined verbiage, the words with rubber meanings, the terms left floating in midstream*" which reduce the rationality of thinking. A. Rand, *Atlas Shrugged,* Rand, Ayn. Atlas Shrugged. Penguin Books, 2007.

[322] G. Sartori, *Homo videns.* Penguin Random House 2007, p. 12.

[323] Sanitary and hygienic campaigns that highlighted the understanding of adaptive/specific immunity and non-specific/innate immunity, with the participation of representatives of the healthcare sector, media, and politicians.

[324] Reference to overcoming the systemic crisis after, on the 6th of January 2021 the premises of the Capitol building were occupied by supporters of the former president Donald Trump who contested the result of the presidential election of the 5th of November 2020.

concepts, such as doctrines and strategies of national security, as well as sector strategies, such as: anti-terrorist, social and economic, informational, energetic, fiscal, health, ICT, educational, climate, and cultural strategies.

Assigning special importance to the notion of "resilience" reflects the nature of: (1) threats to the internal and external security environment of the state, the need to prevent (counteract) destruction, to reduce risk and use the opportunities to protect and defend own potential; (2) redefining crisis management tasks (on the national and extra-national levels); (3) preparing social and professional groups to perform specific duties in extraordinary situations (natural disasters, technological failures, state of emergency, or martial law). The external and internal functional and organisational conditions of the process of shaping social capital in extraordinary situations point our attention to the multi-faceted role of "resilience"[325] – as a psychological and social value that is shaped by means of systemic and *ad hoc* activities, in particular educational ones (e.g. self-learning) , informational and explanatory ones, in particular: active defence against disinformation in order to acquire the ability to recognise, monitor, and analyse the "critical uncertainties"[326], i.e., important factors that influence human beliefs and behaviour (elements of situational awareness) in the situation of destabilised security order, through the following channels of influence: kinetic, informational, information and communication technologies, and the diplomatic channel

"Critical uncertainties" are driving forces that are vital for the nature, scope, and reach of social resilience, i.e., the protection and defence mechanisms that enable quick adaptation to the changes in the security environment and responding quickly to unpredicted crisis situations. They are closely linked to the degree of uncertainty that is provided in the sets of prevention scenarios. These scenarios take into consideration: (1) the trends in social behaviour; (2) the actual access to modern technologies (in particular ICT) and ensuring a specific level of their use   by   social   and   professional   groups; (3) the ability to utilise the existing economic and environmental resources (including striving

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[325] Psychological resistance is defined as the ability to adequately perceive the scale of the difficulties and the situation, to choose own strategy and then implement it and overcome the difficulty in practice. The term "resilience" has been a common term since the 1940. It was used, among others, in military literature, instructions, rules, and guidelines for soldiers, e.g.: *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (FM 33-5): *The Army Field Manual*, Department of The Army, August 1949; *The Soldier`s Guide,* Department Of The Army, June 1942, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952.

[326] "Critical uncertainties" are driving forces that are of vital importance for the nature, scope, and reach of the destruction. The degree of uncertainty plays an important role in selecting the scenarios of counteracting, the analysis of trends in social behaviour, using the existing economic, military, technological, and natural resources, and the political system in making decisions.

for synergy of the public-private partnership in forming resilience); (4) the alignment of the educational model with the informational and explanatory and cultural policy; (5) the degree of social acceptance for the political system and the model of rule of law; (6) the need to implement the standards of extra-national organisations in terms of building the resilience that will be adapted to the dynamically changing security environment.

The product of multiplication of the probability of occurrence of an uncertainty/event and the assessment of its consequences (if it occurs), allows us to determine the so-called "expected value of uncertainty" (the assumed value of relevance and its actual result). Uncertainties with major consequences are referred to as events that are subject to long distribution risks, which are usually situated in the end part of this distribution, not in the central part where the expected results lie. David Omand in his study *How Spies Think. 10 Lessons in Intelligence* points to an important thing, namely that while assessing "uncertainties", during the analyses, judgments tend to appear due to reasons that are not fully conscious and that urge us to act. Namely, intuition (hunches, beyond reason)[327] comes to play and evokes spontaneous impulses or tendencies (illuminations, becoming aware of an invisible truth)[328] in assuming that the likelihood of the occurrence of an uncertainty (event) may as well be higher than the average (median), or lower, as a result of the fact that large-scale social processes including social resilience, are usually subject to the so-called normal, symmetrical distribution of probability in form of the characteristic bell curve[329].

The relations of "critical uncertainties" in the process of shaping social resilience are accompanied by variable equations of risk that provide an assessment of the total loss or gain. Subject literature usually references the equation that is used in the British strategy of combating terrorist – CONTEST[330], where:

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[327] Among many interesting definitions of intuition in the general meaning, an interesting one is presented by David

G. Myers: "our capacity for direct knowledge, for immediate insight without observation or reason". D.G. Myers, *Intuition: its Powers and Perils,* Yale Nota Bene, 2004.

[328] More on the transdisciplinary nature of "intuition" – "what it is and how it works" – study by A. Kołodziejczyk, G. Fuchs, *Intuicja. Czynnik bezpieczeństwa w jednostce penitencjarnej,,* FANCE, Poznań 2022.

[329] D. Omand, *How Spies Think: 10 Lessons in Intelligence,* Viking, 2020.

[330] D. Omand, *What Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?,* in: R. English (eds.), *Illusion of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,* British Academy Scholarship Online, London 2016; A. Franks, *Lines of Defence? Layers of Protection in the COMAH Context,* HSE, London 2017, https://www.hse.gov.uk (accessed: 23.08.2022).

This equation refers to the model of probable layered defence that consists in the fact that some part of the identified threat may be removed on each component layer so that the resultant probability of the "critical uncertainties"/threats (the probability product) on each layer may be kept on the acceptable lowest level.

The reflections on social resilience may take the reconstructive-cognitive and prognostic form by analysing the place and role of: public institutions (administration bodies, the armed forces, security and public order services, education, and culture), non-state agencies (in particular non-military organisations and associations and sports associations), research and science centres, churches and religious congregations, i.e. the whole institutional spectrum that participates in the political and spiritual life of a nation and at the same time is responsible for shaping the "resilience" of individuals as well as social and professional groups against the recognised threats to national security. Adopting such assumption seems fully reasonable and it would be best discussed in a wide monograph, but not in a short review article.

The deliberations on the subject may also have a different nature, e.g., focused on the problem-based approach. The main aim of such assumption may be the analysis of the notions and claims, determining and arranging the issues that are the most important from the point of view of shaping "resilience" as a specific social potential in the situation of the threat of manipulating information (fragmentation, immediateness, high rate of information flow with use of the forms and means of digital control). The analyses of social resilience may be complemented by the presentation and interpretation of the results of social polls concerning the perception of social resilience in the context of the defence duties of Polish citizens after Russia has expanded its aggression in Ukraine[331].

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[331] The war in Ukraine does not apply only to the country affected, but it constitutes a specific referendum on the future of the world, in which the choice is between the readiness to accept the authoritarian project that manifests itself in form of Russian military and bureaucratic imperialism, and the world of imperfect, yet still valuable liberal democracy.

1. Social resilience – an integral element that supports protection and defence

From the point of view of social needs, the aim of shaping social resilience is to form an important mechanism to support the beliefs and behaviour of individuals and social and professional groups in pursuing the fundamental goals of national security policy and alliance commitments. The axis of the programme and organisational educational, informational, and explanatory procedures is the assumption that own weaknesses may be successfully transformed into a driving power that improves the efficiency of the performance of duties which are characteristic for extraordinary situations, with the participation of actions that serve: "reconstructing", "reinventing", supporting "change drivers" and overcoming identified and interpreted destruction.

New cognitive and utilitarian impulses connected to the role of "resilience" (French: *la resilience,* German *Widerstand,* Latin *resistentia,* Greek *antistasi*) were provided, among others, by the research and publications by Boris Cyrulnik (French psychiatrist) in the first decade of the 21st century. Analysing the conditions that serve the shaping of resilience, he points to the following issues: (1) the subjective aspect, i.e. individual traits of temper and personality that influence psychological resilience and the ability to act in extraordinary situations, the level of intelligence: general and technical knowledge, the sense of national identity, and motivations considering the specific social and professional needs; (2) educational, cultural, and informational and explanatory factors, including the programme and organisational models that create systems to improve the professional skills of teaching personnel and to adapt the communication concept to the pluralist needs of the recipients; (3) the environmental factor, i.e. social background, gender, age, education, interests, the characteristics of interpersonal relations, the *raison d'etat* and the distribution of support among the public, the perception of the defence duties. According to Cyrulnik, the "resilience" of an individual are the shaped abilities/potentials aimed at achieving success, positive life, and development in a socially acceptable manner, despite stress or adversities (such as security threats) that usually imply a serious risk of failure[332]. The tendency to violent reactions and mood swings that results, among others, from traumatic experiences, points to the need to maintain organisational consistency, order, to gather "under the flag" (the belief in the

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[332] E. Pieiller, *Odporność wszędzie, oporu brak,* „Le Monde *diplomatique*" (Polish edition), May/June 2021, p. 4. In Poland, the works by B. Cyrulnik were published in the years 2009-2014 by Wydawnictwo Czarna Owca: *Anatomia uczuć (Les Nourritures Affectives)* (2009), *Rozmowy o miłości, na skraju przepaści (Talking of Love on the Edge of a Precipice)* (2011), *O ciele i duszy (De chaire at d'ame)* (2012), *Ratuj się, życie wzywa (Sauve-toi, la vie t'appelle)* (2014).

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capability of at least technocratic leadership) and to obtain reliable information. The most dangerous think is the lack of knowledge that provides ground for lies, disinformation, half-truths, and omissions.

The goal-and-task-based model of shaping "resilience" adopted by Cyrulnik found numerous followers, but it also has a group of opponents. The most well-known person in the latter group is Thierry Ribault (Doctor of Economics, a French analyst who conducts research on the sensitivity of security, social policy of knowledge and ignorance, who cooperates with the International Laboratory for the protection of humans and responding to disasters). In his study entitled *Contra la résislience. Á Fukushima et ailleurs*, he pointed out the adaptive and autonomous issues connected to the role of resilience in public life, highlighting the occurrence of the phenomenon of instrumentalisation (here appropriation) of the functional values of "resilience" by political forces and to the fact that the "resilience" model developed by Cyrulnik lacks the elements of relevance of the probabilistic dynamics of threats to the external and internal security environment.

For Ribault, including the task to shape social resilience in the current political games that strives to satisfy interests (characteristic of the autocratic mentality that leads to conflicts), denies the idea of servitude understood as a sensitive common good. Social resilience in its essence should remain a strategic and operational good in terms of the adaptation skills and human protective abilities, the sense of stability that allows us to overcome helplessness and to cope with reality. The adaptation capacity of resilience should be manifested, among others, in the mechanisms of effective management of security structures and systems, in particular the protection of critical infrastructure (CI). The factor that determines the quality of such protection, apart from the organisational and technological elements, is building resistance against various types of destruction caused by external and internal factors, at the same time ensuring the transformation of these systems to enable them to function in modified conditions.

Ribault assumes that ideologized resilience loses its natural, common driving power so that it is necessary to reject the "resilience ideology" that discriminates the responsibility in the face of challenges and threats to security. He opposes Cyrulnik, pointing to the ambiguity of the use of psychological resources that obscure the sustainability of an individual's adaptation without the need to challenge the new circumstances in which they find themselves. This results from the fact that the etymology of the term "resilience" reveals its connections to human adaptive capacity, to certain forms of "soft eugenics"[333].

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[333] The study by T. Ribault *Contra la résislience. Á Fukushima et ailleurs* (L`Échappée, Paris 2021) was published during the first wave of the Covid19 pandemic and it was considered as an important intellectual contribution to

The value of the analyses by T. Ribault lies in distinguishing the issue of "overcoming/recovering from a crisis" by an individual or professional group to survive in the "saved world", e.g., after an armed conflict or natural disaster. According to him, such "saved world" is *de facto* a "false world" that has been reduced, among others, in terms of the previously perceived and practiced freedoms, a world that is "different" from the accepted one, transitioning into a "closed/exclusive world" with the properties of a state of emergency. In order to survive in the new, distorted functional environment, e.g., in the situation of helplessness faced with the imposed political and legal solutions or models of behaviour, one has to embrace the state of the accepted (conscious) loss of freedom, but also to abide by the rigour of the new rules of conduct that result from the extraordinary reality and the binding regimen of crisis management.

As an example of human functioning in extraordinary situations, Ribault refers to the failure of the Japanese nuclear power plant in Fukushima in 2011, which was caused by a series of system failures following the earthquake at the coast of the Honshu Island. As a result, over ten thousand people were evacuated from the area that might be exposed to radiation. They were subjected to onerous rigour of post-radiation assimilation. Ribault defines the arbitrary mode of forming resilience in new existential conditions as a "technological necessity of consent" that serves to accept the existing reality, regardless of the burdens that it causes. In practice, this means being subordinated to the regulations of an extraordinary situation that includes, among others, the ban on protesting, and the imposed obligation to participate in controlling the mandatory attitudes and behaviour. Rigorous solutions result in a synergy of confirming the ability to manifest conscious resilience without showing "opposing defiance"[334].

Ribault emphasises that resilience in the "world in a state of emergency" may be an effective instrument that supports the "control by fear of fear", which makes it easier to accept living in the conditions of "rebuilding stability"[335]. Describing fear as an irrational fact (a factor that cannot be subjected to predictions, has no tangible reasons, and results from human psychology) that is counterproductive, but also convinces people to overcome it, Ribault emphasises that public authorities may intentionally deny the fears that are evoked, for example, by toxic or radiation threats. At the same time, these authorities consider that emotions that

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the organisation of actions to prevent the spread of the pandemic and to build resistance. According to security analysts, the reflections provided in *Contra la résislience. Á Fukushima et ailleurs* may also be used to construct a concept of counteracting the effects of global warming and industrial pollution and in social, economic, and military issues.

[334] Ibidem, p. 31.

[335] Ibidem, p. 155.

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control behaviour may improve the understanding of the nature of the threats e.g., ecological fears connected to radiation and the need to address them (all that exists is inside us), instead of only pointing to the objective reasons of the existing situation[336]. Other important characteristics of social resilience are the ability to recognize the nature and effects of security threats and the understanding of the need for individuals to "reinvent themselves on the ruins of the reality lost", to be able to leave the deformed world and become ready to confront the destruction[337]. Turbulences or disturbances are usually accompanied by exposure to suffering. This means that it is necessary to define the individualisation of risk and to understand its subjectivity. Most people are not sufficiently prepared to perceive risks in the world of economic and military instability, especially as *ad hoc* solutions (submitting to the culture of immediateness, the obsession of speed) are appropriate in multiple areas of public life[338].

One of the authors who analyse the importance of the balance between reason and emotions in reference to the tasks and goals of social resilience is Eric Singler (an analyst of the BVA[339] Nudge Unit[340]). As one of the authors of the monograph *Nudge management: Applying Behavioural Science to boost wellbeing and performance*[341] he highlights the role of resilience and the frames into which the method of "fabricating permission" fits. The method is responsible for launching the counteraction mechanisms/techniques (good practices) in order to influence the motivations and decisions made in the following situations: (1) public discontent with the destruction against people, the violation of the *status quo* of interpersonal relations, among others, common good and public interest; (2) defence against the

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[336] Ibidem, p. 255.

[337] The view of Ribault refers to the description of a human, whose actions lead to destruction. Such vision was presented, among others, by A. Rand, who used the term "savage" to describe a man who believes thet "physical objects are endowed with a mysterious volition, moved by causeless, unpredictable whims". A. Rand, *Atlas Shrugged,* p. 1646.

[338] Ibidem, p. 256.

[339] BVA Group is a French analytical and consulting company that develops projections to understand the motivations of individuals and the formation of habits, to predict their main moves and of methods of communication that enable building, stimulating, and converting thanks to the power of ideas, imagination, and creativity. E. Pieiller, *Odporność wszędzie, oporu brak,* ibidem, p. 4.

[340] The BVA Nudge Unit (a subsidiary of the BVA Group in France) employs consultants who focus on knowledge about the application of behavioural sciences in business and the challenges of public policy, in particular change management, *leadership coaching*, sector research, designing, communication, and trainings. During the first and second wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the BVA Nudge Unit advised the French government on managing the pandemic.

[341] E. Singler, C.R. Sunstein, P. Chandon, *Nudge management: Applying Behavioural Science to boost wellbeing and performance*, Pearson Education, 2019.

disintegration of functionality and increasing control over unstable reality[342]; (3) apathy and loss of human natural creative abilities (denying behaviours of "copycats", "recyclers", "mental parasites".

Singler points to the problems that occur in the practice of shaping social resilience. As an example, he discusses downplaying the fact that "informing and convincing an individual who does not behave in a rational way with use of rational elements does not result in the modification of their behaviour". In such situation, the "nudge" method does not lead to an actual change in human behaviour, e.g., accepting the restrictions of freedom that are necessary to improve the situation of the person and the community. Creating specific motivations, e.g., rationalism, altruism and perceiving these values in the context of the interests and goals should involve the transition from verbal announcements to specific, practical informational, explanatory, and educational actions that form the professional and social competences[343].

2. Social resilience in the projections of the Council of Europe, the North At-lantic Treaty Organisation and the national security strategy of Poland

Social resilience as a mechanism for coping with threats and, at the same time, an ability to adapt to a potentially long-term change in the civilian and military sphere in an evolutionary (and sometimes rapid) way is becoming an increasingly important element of the programming and organisational and legal solutions in the European Union, and in the projections signed by the agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The destabilisation of the European security environment that results from the manifestations of the military aggressiveness of the Russian Federation and its multidimensional hybrid actions against the Western civilisation has directed our attention to the need for systemic shaping of resilience in individuals, social groups, and the institutional potential of the state. An example are the activities of the EU that are aimed at coordinating programmes to support both the resilience of state agencies and populations to terrorist threats, the risk of hybrid and cyber-attacks, climate and energy threats, and risks related to refugees, migrations, and the pandemic. Among others, since December 2019, the European Union has accelerated the conceptual works on the

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[342] Protecting the rights of individuals remains the essence of the rule of law in a democratic state. The adopted legislative solutions have to be objective and be justified objectively, i.e., people must know how they are allowed to function by the law.

[343] E. Singler, C.R. Sunstein, P. Chandon *Nudge management: Applying Behavioral Science to boost wellbeing and performance,* op. cit. Barbara Stiegler (French philosopher) in her study *Il faut s'adapter": Sur un nouvel impératif politique* (Published by Gallimard, Paris 2019) states that resilience is shaped with the participation of mechanisms that influence the "subconsciousness of human behaviour".

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"societal resilience" and implementing the model: "the more resilient the neighbours, the safer the Union" (the result of the "Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation on the cooperation in counteracting threats for security" adopted in July 2018). In 2020, after a year's debate, the European Commission presented an agenda of supporting Member States in predicting, preventing, protection, and responding to terrorist threats. One of the main priorities is building resistance to terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure[344].

NATO took too long to return to its historical experiences of shaping societal resilience of the Western world with the participation of its own agencies and Member States. The directional activities in this issue were formulated only during the NATO summits in Newport (2014) and Warsaw (2016). The Organisation acknowledged the need to improve resilience understood as continuous development of the individual and collective ability to repel the potential attack (the fundamental objectives of the Washington Treaty) and an integral element of supporting policy of deterrence and defence against any form of destruction. This means the coordination of efforts with the aim to seek actions that force the enemy to abandon the attack by convincing it that the intended destruction will not allow it to achieve the planned goals and that it may be too costly. In general terms, the objectives of NATO will include improving resilience to support the allied military forces in the European operating theatre, contribute to the deterrence and the proper functioning of the state and to protect the population. The tasks were assigned to the Civil Emergency Planning Committee of the NATO (CEPC) and the Civil Protection Group (CPG). Such approach to resilience assumes the cooperation between the military and non-military systems, from the planning stage to reconstruction[345]. This approach foresees the need to improve: (1) communication with the community – ensuring a high level of trust between the authorities and citizens, in particular in situations of hybrid threats; (2)

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[344] In order to invest in the resilience of Critical Infrastructure, the European Commission, considering the experiences of the *EU Protective Security Advisors (PSE)*, proposed to establish expert missions to support the Member States in analysing risks. To improve the resilience of European cities that may be the targets of terrorist attacks, the Commission proposed: (1) the PACTESUR *(Protecting Allied Cities Against Terrorism by Securing Urban Areas) programme; (2)* establishing the *EU Knowledge Hub*; (3) instruments of financial support as part of the Internal Security Fund. The issues of resilience and protection of critical infrastructure were placed among the priority tasks for the years 2021-2024 (among others, all critical entities identified pursuant to the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities would be subject to obligations related to cyber-resilience. A. Gasztold, P. Gasztold, *The Polish Counterterrorism System and Hybrid Warfare Threats*, „Terrorism and Political Violence" 2020; *Security Union: A Counter-Terrorism Agenda and stronger Europol to boost the EU's resilience Brussels*, 9 December 2020, www.europa.eu (access of the 12.09.2022).
[345] The concept of developing works on resilience distinguishes three main modules together with the need to achieve synergy of: (1) the public sector (including civilian-military cooperation on issues related to strengthening security); (2) *public-private cooperation* focused on the use of civilian resources by the Alliance; (3) the community, i.e. raising awareness of potential threats, shaping skills and competences of adequate response in counteracting dangerous phenomena or tendencies of a hybrid nature, mainly, disinformation, economic, and cultural phenomena.

expanding education – understanding the nature of the dangerous event/phenomenon by providing knowledge on how to minimise the risk of threat or how to cope if it occurs (3) self-organisation of citizens in areas that are the subject of common interests[346].

NATO assumes that there are at least two interconnected challenges in the sphere of social resilience: ensuring the ability to move the necessary military units and equipment to the operating area in the event of a threat or attack (including full, undisturbed access to functional infrastructure) and monitoring, analysing, and counteracting hybrid attacks to minimise their destructive influence on the social, political, and military consistency of the Organisation. Additionally, as part of civil preparedness, the Member States are obliged to ensure the cyber protection of critical IT networks, those cooperating with NATO, to be capable of solving problems resulting from uncontrolled mobility of people in an effective way, to possess adequately protected food and water reserves and to solve problems resulting from a large number of casualties, as well as to ensure resistant communication and transport systems. Another, equally important sphere of building the resilience capacity, is the strategy of responding to hybrid warfare, assessing the related risks with use of early warning indicators that launch the appropriate options of responding to crisis.

In Poland, the issues of shaping social resilience are addressed in the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland of 2015, the National Anti-terrorist Programme for the years 2015-2019 (Monitor Polski of December 24, 2014, item 1218) and the Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland of 2020 (Chapter 4. *National Resilience and Common Defence).* The "Strategy", taking into account security threats that are divided into five categories: natural, civilizational, military, terrorist to the occurrence of a crisis situation and cyber threats[347] - *expressis verbis emphasises the necessity to improve the resilience of the state to threats by means of creating a common defence system that is based on the effort of the whole nation and building understanding of the development of defence and the defence capacities of the Republic of Poland, with the participation of*: (1) a system of common defence that will fully use the potential of public and self-government institutions, educational system and academic entities, local communities, business entities, non-governmental organisations, as well as citizens, and that will constitute the comprehensive defence of the state to military and non-military threats, including those of hybrid nature; (2) a common nature of civil defence and

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[346] J. Shea, Odporność: kluczowy element obrony zbiorowej, "NATO Rewiev", March 30 2016.

[347] A similar taxonomy of threats was accepted by the Council of Ministers in the Resolution 34/2021 of March 11, 2021 (fifth edition of the *Report on threats to national security* for the purposes of the National Crisis Management Plan) that also distinguishes the National Plan of the Protection of Critical Infrastructure.

population protection as well as gathering and maintaining the capacity to recreate the necessary resources; (3) the knowledge and understanding of the essence of national security, the role of public authorities, including self-government bodies, units that create the educational, academic, and scientific systems, the economy, non-governmental organisations, and citizens in adapting to the changing needs in connection with promoting patriotic attitudes, civil duties, and pro-social behaviour as elements of the social capital that is created as part of the cooperation in the network of social organisations; (4) the system of civil defence and population protection that will involve improving the resistance to the threats to the continuity of the governance and functioning of the state, energy supplies, uncontrolled migration and relocation of people, collecting, protecting, and managing food and water resources, the ability to act in the event of mass accidents, providing resistant telecommunication and IT networks, warning and information systems, and a reliable transport system; (5) new solutions to protect critical infrastructure, human resource management systems, including the management of staff reserves for the needs of national security, prevention and responding to terrorist threats and combating organised crime, including criminal activity in cyberspace[348].

The planned programming and organisational solutions for shaping resilience should be adopted and implemented in a fast track, under a cross-party agreement, e.g., by processing the Act on the Defence of Homeland in March 2022. The analysis of social resilience in the context of civil duty, which was conducted in form of a survey, points to the existing insufficient understanding of the needs concerning the anticipated threats to security[349].

3. Selected issues of "social resilience" in the context of defence duties ac-cording to the survey conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS)

One of the specific criteria for assessing the perception and state of social resilience in Poland is the attitude of Polish citizens to military conscription. On February 11, 2009, obligatory military service was suspended, and in January 2010 the process of full professionalization of the Polish Army was completed. Pursuant to the Act on Homeland

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[348] *Strategy of National security of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw2020, https://www.bbn.gov.pl (accessed: 12.09.2022); *National Crisis Management Plan,* https://rcb.gov.pl (accessed: 12.09.2022); *National Plan of Protection of Critical Infrastructure,* https://rcb.gov.pl (accessed: 12.09.2022).

[349] Human needs and their practice, including the understanding of the interest of the state, are usually discussed in relation to the system of socially and individually approved values (common awareness and theoretical awareness) (part of the reflections on the scientific ideology of social programmes, and strategies of an institutionalised nature).

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Defence of March 11, 2022 (Journal of Laws item 655)[350] basic military service is voluntary in the conditions of peace (compulsory service exists in the situation of the threat of war). The analysis of the results of surveys on national defence conducted by CBOS in the years 2008-2022 revealed some interesting trends. Data from the survey "Polish citizens on military service" of February 2008 considered the stabilised situation of the security environment and the mixed composition of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (including almost 60 thousand of soldiers in compulsory military service). Moreover, there was no planned date of suspending this type of service. The problem research of August 2014 showed, in the light of the incorporation of the Crimea by Russia and the start of conflict in eastern Ukraine, a change in the attitudes of Poles to the performance of the obligatory military service.

In May 2022 (i.e., in the third month of the full-scale war in Ukraine) 45 per cent of respondents stated that the majority of the Polish Army should consist of professional soldiers. At the same time, respondents pointed out the possibility and need to maintain conscription[351].

Diagram 1. Distribution of answers to the question: Do you think that, in times of peace, Poland should return to common conscription to basic military service and that all persons who can perform such service should be enlisted?

Own study based on CBOS Announcement No. 79, *On state security and issues related to defence, June 2022*

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[350] The details are provided in the Ordinance of the Minister of National defence of April 28 2022 r. on assigning and directing persons to perform compulsory military service (Journal of Laws of 2022, item 951). The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland need to be supplemented in the event of threats to the national security, supplementation of personnel reserves for the purposes of active military service performed in mobilisation is announced and to obtain new qualifications or improve educational or professional qualifications or training in competences that are useful for military service.

[351] Announcement of the CBOS (prepared by B. Badora), On national security and issues related to defence, June 2022.

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A fully professional military force (based on a voluntary contract) was supported by 39 per cent of respondents. In total, more than half of all respondents accepted the possibility of common conscription, compared to 35 per cent in 2008. Thus, over half of the respondents would be willing to support the return to obligatory military service in Poland, justifying it by situational necessity. 29 per cent stated that military service should rather be restored, while 39 per cent were against this solution, including 15 per cent who were strongly opposed to the possibility of restoring compulsory service. 7 per cent of respondents preferred not to answer this question. The opinions on lifting the suspension of the duty to perform military service in form of conscription depend, among others, on the declared political views.

Figure 1. Distribution of the answers concerning restoring the common conscription for compulsory military service in times of peace and enlisting all those who are capable to perform such service (per cent)

Options	What party did you vote for in the parliamentary election in 2019?				
	Wide right-wing and conservative coalition: PiS, Solidarna Polska, Partia Republikańska	Koalicja Platforma Obywatelska, Nowoczesna, Inicjatywa Poland, Zieloni	Nowa Lewica, Razem	Konfederacja, WiN, Korwin, Ruch Narodowy	Polska 2050
Yes, conscription for military service should definitely be restored	35	21	20	21	18
Yes, conscription for military service should rather be restored	33	24	15	40	16
Conscription should rather not be restored	20	32	41	13	25
Conscription should definitely not be restored	8	20	20	22	28
It is difficult to say	4	3	3	5	12

Own study based on CBOS Announcement *On national security… (ibidem)*

The most supporters of restoring common conscription during peace (total of 59 per cent, including 27 per cent strongly supporting the idea) were found among people who identified with the political right wing. On the other hand, left-wing supporters were opposed to this form of service (22 per cent). In the light of declared political party preferences, research revealed that the most supporters of common conscription are found among persons who vote for PiS – 68 per cent, followed by voters of Konfederacja and WiN (61 per cent). In the groups of potential voters for the Koalicja Obywatelska and Polska 2050 most respondents were moderate opponents of compulsory military service – 52 and 53 per cent, respectively.

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Considering the analysed sociodemographic variables in the surveyed group, it seems remarkable that more men (18 per cent) than women (13 per cent) are opponents of the idea of returning to compulsory military service. The total share of strong and moderate opponents of common conscription is higher among men than among women, respectively: 43 and 37 per cent. At the same time, women avoid taking a position on this issue more often: 9 and 4 per cent. The attitude to restoring common conscription also differs depending on the level of education. The higher the education of respondents, the lower the support for obligatory service (per cent): higher education: 15%, primary school and gymnasium graduates – 33%. As far as the age of respondents is concerned, the necessity to restore compulsory service is emphasised by respondents aged 55 and over, while respondents aged 18-34 are strongly against it. The need to return to common conscription is more often expressed by residents of villages and small towns than by respondents who live in large cities with a population of more than 50 thousand   residents.
The answers to the question: How long should compulsory military service last if it were restored? are distributed as follows:

| Number of months	Support (%)
24	13
18	8
12/9	35
6	8
Less than 6 months	18
It is difficult to say	19

Own study based on CBOS Announcement No. 79. *On national security… (ibidem)*

The largest group of respondents (35%) stated that compulsory service should last one year, and 18 per cent considered six months' service as a good solution. The preferences concerning the duration of the hypothetically reactivated military service differed significantly

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depending on the age of respondents. Persons aged 25-35 preferred the shortest duration. On the other hand, respondents aged over 65 stated that it is justified for compulsory service to last more than one year, while women believed that the maximum duration of service should be 6 months.

An important element of the CBOS surveys analysing the perception of defence in Poland in terms of the preparedness for performing defence duties are the data about the related knowledge and experience of respondents. After the suspension of compulsory military service in 2008 and the full professionalization of the army, the percentage share of persons who had the appropriate experience in performing service and military training changed significantly. In the survey of May 2022, only 24 per cent of the respondents stated that they had performed or were currently performing military service or training. In the CBOS survey of 1999, nearly 39% of respondents declared that they had such experiences. Altogether, including the respondents who declared any experience in defence or protection, the group of Poles who had any knowledge or experience that might be useful during a war accounted for 1/3 of the participants of the survey of May 2022. The answers to the questions where respondents were asked to assess their knowledge and military or defence abilities in a situation when their place of residence was directly threatened by the actions of an aggressor reveal the scale of the problem concerning the hypothetical behaviour in an extraordinary situation.

Diagram 2. Assessment of own knowledge and abilities related to national defence in case of military aggression and the actions in the event of direct threat to their place of residence caused by military actions.


Own study based on CBOS Announcement *On national security… (ibidem)*

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Only 5 per cent of the respondent stated that they were prepared to act appropriately in the event of identified threats, while 39 per cent declared that they had some general knowledge but noticed the theoretical and practical deficits. Over 35 per cent stated that they possessed knowledge about pro-defence behaviour. Three out of a hundred refused to assess their knowledge about defending the country in the case of military aggression. The declarations vary depending on the gender. 59 per cent of men believe that they know how to behave and act in the event if their place of residence is directly threatened by the actions of an aggressor. Every tenth respondent believes that he has proper knowledge in this area. On the other hand, 64 per cent of women declare that they know little on the subject (41 per cent) or know nothing at all (23 per cent). Only 2 per cent declared that they had good knowledge and practical skills. The declarations of women differed depending on the level of education. 35 per cent of men aged 35 and over declared that they had general knowledge and pro-defence skills. The worst results were noted in the group of men aged 25-24. 18 per cent of then stated that they had absolutely no knowledge or skills related to defence, and only 1 per cent believed that they knew how to behave and act correctly in the event of direct threat to national security.

The answers to the question how ordinary citizens should be trained in defence skills (knowledge + skills) in case of aggression are as follows (per cent):

Diagram 3. Distribution of the opinions of respondents about training ordinary citizens in defence skills in case of military aggression in Poland (per cent)


Own study, based on CBOS Announcement *On national security… (ibidem)*

78 per cent of the respondents are in favour of organising military training, including 45 per cent who support obligatory training. 35 per cent declared that only adults should undergo

this form of training. According to 17 per cent of the respondents, there is no need to conduct military trainings for all civilians and that defence duties should be performed only by the armed forces and specialised state services. Considering the political preferences, it is worth noting that voters of Konfederacja and WiN (57 per cent) and PiS (49 per cent) support general training regardless of their age, while, in the opinion of left-wing supporters, only adults should undergo defence training. The highest support (88%) for conducting defence trainings for citizens in case of aggression was noted in the 18-24 age group. Moreover, 53 per cent of the youngest respondents declare that all citizens should participate in such training. The idea of educating ordinary citizens in defence meets relatively lower support among residents of the largest cities, who place higher trust in the professionalism and equipment of the armed forces and specialist services that are responsible for protecting national security.

Asking about the possibilities to develop the package of actions that would contribute to improving the security and defence of Poland, the CBOS asked the respondents to express their opinions on the ability to use firearms and to shoot. The answers differed depending on the declared political views, age, and gender of the respondents. The more to the left the participants placed themselves on the right wing – left wing axis, the more often they were opposed to the use of firearms by all citizens.

Diagram 4. Should the defence training include learning how to use and shoot firearms?

Own study based on CBOS Announcement *On national security… (ibidem)*

The groups that most often supported obligatory firearms training included right-wing and ultra-right-wing supporters (30%), including Law and Justice (PiS) – 32% and Konfederacja WiN – 27%. Lower support was noted among the voters of Koalicja

Obywatelska, left-wing parties and Polska 2050, respectively: 24, 22 and 20 per cent. The survey also contained a question about the right to possess firearms in Poland. The results are shown in the illustration below.

Figure 2. How widespread or limited should the right to own firearms be in Poland? Which of the statements best describes your views on this issue?

Characteristics of the view/opinion	Data (%)
Every citizen should have the right to own firearms, unless he or she is explicitly forbidden to do so by the court; access to firearms should be rationed, but a larger number of persons should own firearms in Poland	23
The current regulations on access to firearms and the number of persons who own firearms are completely sufficient.	35
The current regulations on access to firearms in Poland are too liberal so too many people in Poland own firearms. This right should be limited, so that nobody except for the officers of uniformed services will have the right to own firearms.	35
It is difficult to say/Answer not provided	7

Source: Own study based on CBOS Announcement *On national security… (ibidem)*

Both voters of PiS and Konfederacja WiN belong to the strongest advocates of improving access to firearms in Poland. Respondents with centrist views support maintaining the s*tatus quo,* while left-wing groups were in favour of restricting access. The survey of CBOS allows us to estimate the sensitivity threshold, i.e., the conditions that are necessary to shape resilience in terms of security and defence. Moreover, it is believed that the forming system should be based mainly on professional services organised in adequate structures in times of peace and expanded to the required size in extraordinary situations.

4. Conclusion

The belief that it is necessary to pay appropriate attention to preparing the population to counteract extraordinary threats, and to mitigate their effects with the use of self-defence shaped through mechanisms of social resilience is becoming increasingly popular. Modern self-defence must consider the needs to recuperate the forms of shaping this resilience, considering:

- the need to prevent chaos ant to maintain the ability of abstract thinking and synthesis of the essence of the identified threats[352] and to shape the understanding of "sacrifice"

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[352] In principle, practical decisions of humans should be preceded by reflection to be considered as rational decisions, especially in extraordinary situations.

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which is an important mechanism of functioning of the community, related, among others, to "ensuring the adequate level of armed preparedness" as an integral element of guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state

- ensuring the protection of human rights[353] – including the right to: self-defence (no man should withdraw from combating evil), maintaining the integrity of collective interest and *raison d'etat* (understanding the balance between egoistic interests and goals of individuals and the common interest[354]), developing the ability to prevent the loss of functionality and to control situations related to security threats as a result of emerging social or military conflict or the occurrence of technological failures and natural disasters

- defence against controlled destruction[355] aimed against others, the desired sub-regional, regional and global security order and other rational values[356], including a security policy that is based on categorical mechanisms that combine collective standards that limit the destructive manifestations of egoism, in other words understanding that negativity or evil require the absence of knowledge, effectiveness, or consensus concerning the fundamental principles

- Monitoring, diagnosing/identifying an interpreting the overlapping crises: the geopolitical crisis (including the new nuclear threat), financial and economic recession, climate and energy crisis, and, finally, the refugee and migration crisis.

Streszczenie

Odporność, wartość transdyscyplinarna, obejmująca funkcje orientujące przekonania i zachowania: (uczucia, myślenie, percepcję i intuicję), ma do spełnienia szczególną rolę w utrzymywaniu równowagi społecznej i co za tym idzie sprawności systemów bezpieczeństwa i

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[353] Human rights may be violated using physical force or informational violence. In this way, one person may kill other people, imprison them, rob, prevent them from pursuing their own goals, or force them to act contrary to their own reasonable judgment. A special consequence of the human right to live is the right to self-defence. In the civilised world force may be used only to defend oneself from those who used it first.

[354] Ensuring the integration of opinions of most of the population, who may even support the policy of the government, but show passive/silent loyalty and lack of strong support for the participation in the war.

[355] Manifestations of destruction may include falsified hate, passiveness, laziness, a sense of meaninglessness in life, discouragement, or sadness.

[356] Value, understood as something that is pursued ("to achieve it", not values *sui generis*), or that is obtained/achieved; something that is valuable, important, and valid; properties - material/object and action/activity.

obronności. Chaos i ryzyko zwracają uwagę na konieczność rozpoznawania przestrzeni konfrontacji, diagnozowania, przeciwdziałania i unikania strat w stopniu, którego można osiągnąć. Chodzi m.in. o tworzenie wyjątkowego mechanizmu kształtującego przekonania o posiadaniu sił i środków, które w odczuciu człowieka służą skutecznemu utrzymywaniu równowagi. Odporność zwiększa poczucie daremności poczynań agresora/destruktora, wzmacnia świadomość sytuacyjną, czyli zrozumienie, co się dzieje i jak należy się zachowywać.

Słowa kluczowe:
Bezpieczeństwo narodowe, odporność, świadomość sytuacyjna,
przeciwdziałanie zagrożeniem

Key words:
National security, resilience, situational awareness, threat prevention

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